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For about 50 years—at least since Texas Gulf Sulphur—the SEC has
ordered defendants to disgorge their profits from transactions that violated
the securities laws. Despite disgorgement’s long history, in its 2017 opinion
in Kokesh v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court put two aspects of the remedy
on the table. It applied a five-year statute of limitations to disgorgement. It
also reopened old questions about agencies’ power to seek remedies not
specified in statute. This article provides data to inform these debates over
the agency’s use of disgorgement and the effects of Kokesh. It reports the
results of an empirical study of ten years of the remedies ordered by the
SEC in insider trading actions, with particular emphasis on the agency’s
reliance on disgorgement. It finds widespread reliance on disgorgement,
but also identifies aspects of its use that may limit Kokesh’s effects in this
area.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FROM TEXAS GULF SULPHUR TO KOKESH . . . . . . . . 1001
II. REMEDIES IN SEC INSIDER TRADING
ENFORCEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
III. STUDY OF DISGORGEMENT IN INSIDER
TRADING: FY2005-FY2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
A. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
B. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006
1. Monetary Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006
2. Patterns of Disgorgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008
3. Relationship Between Disgorgement and Money
Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
4. Prejudgment Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. I appreciate the comments of Richard
Kaplan, Gabriele La Nave, Michael Perino, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, and Daniel Walfish,
and the research assistance of Soffia H. Kuehner Gray and the University of Illinois Law
Library.
999
1000 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
A team of geologists, engineers, and geophysicists from Texas GulfSulphur (TGS) first noticed promising anomalies in a tract ofseemingly barren and swampy land in eastern Canada.1 Quietly,
this initial promise was confirmed to be the discovery of a lifetime.2 As
rumors of a major ore strike bubbled up, TGS tamped them down with a
discouraging press release.3 But results from core samples were unprece-
dented, and the company ultimately announced its discovery to the
public.
Engineer and geophysicist Richard H. Clayton was part of the original
TGS survey team. The day before the announcement, Clayton bought 200
shares of TGS stock, taking advantage of a share price that rocketed after
the discovery was made public.4 He made money but did not hold onto it
for long. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Clayton,
TGS, and other individual insider defendants in federal court.5 Ulti-
mately, the court ordered Clayton to give up the money he made from
trading on this information. Clayton was not alone. Several of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur individual defendants had to relinquish the gains of their
wrongful conduct—disgorge their insider trading profits.6
Just as Texas Gulf Sulphur has reached its fiftieth anniversary, so has
the SEC’s use of the disgorgement remedy. The case was one of the first
judicial recognitions of the SEC’s disgorgement authority, which became
a staple of SEC enforcement in insider trading cases and beyond.7 None-
theless, in its 2017 opinion in Kokesh v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court
reopened old debates over agencies’ power to seek remedies not speci-
fied in statute.8 In the process, the Court pointed to Texas Gulf Sulphur
as the starting point of this remedial power and used its description of the
remedy’s purpose to support its holding.9
This article provides data to inform these debates over the agency’s use
of disgorgement and this part of Texas Gulf Sulphur’s legacy. It reports
the results of an empirical study of ten years of the remedies ordered by
the SEC in insider trading cases, with particular emphasis on the agency’s
reliance on disgorgement. This article adds granularity to available infor-
mation, providing a detailed account of SEC practice in the particular
1. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843.
3. Newspapers headlines reported “Copper Rumor Deflated.” See id. at 846 (quoting
N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Apr. 13, 1964).
4. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 847.
5. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. at 267–69.
6. See id.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC,
1977 DUKE L. J. 641, 642 (1977); Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017) (pointing to
Texas Gulf Sulphur as “one of the first cases requiring disgorgement in SEC proceedings”).
8. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1641.
9. Id. at 1643.
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area of insider trading, suggesting some implications of these patterns,
and identifying areas for further study.
The article begins by tracing the connections between Texas Gulf
Sulphur and Kokesh, and by outlining the legal framework for the SEC’s
insider trading remedies. The article then reports the results of the under-
lying study of how the SEC used the disgorgement remedy in insider
trading cases from SEC FY2005 to FY2015. Finally, the article considers
some of the implications of these data and briefly concludes.
I. FROM TEXAS GULF SULPHUR TO KOKESH
Texas Gulf Sulphur was one of the first cases to recognize the power of
the court to require defendants to give up their profits from transactions
that violated the securities laws.10 The trial court that ordered this rem-
edy pointed to the court’s “inherent equity power to grant relief ancillary
to an injunction” when “such relief has been necessary for the protection
of the investing public.”11 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
agreed that “[i]t would severely defeat the purposes of the Act if a viola-
tor of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to retain the profits from his violation,”
and allowed the remedy as part of the trial court’s “equity powers.”12 In
doing so, it approved a remedy that the SEC had not previously sought in
federal court, although it had obtained it in a few prior settlements.13 The
court’s conclusion had implications beyond insider trading: disgorgement
and other “ancillary” remedies soon became key tools for the SEC and
other agencies.
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited disgorgement’s origin story in 2017.
In a suit brought by the SEC, “[a] jury found that [Charles] Kokesh had
committed securities fraud by siphoning off millions of dollars from in-
vestors” between 1995 and 2009.14 Kokesh had been taking this money
for more than a decade, but civil actions that seek penalties, fines, or
forfeitures are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.15 Kokesh could
be fined only for what he had done in the last five years, but how many
years of wrongful profits did he have to disgorge? The Court had to de-
10. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
11. Id.
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. See Ellsworth, supra note 7, at 642; Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s
Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1111–14 (2008) (tracing the his-
tory of the SEC’s use of disgorgement as a remedy for securities violations).
14. See Federal Court Imposes $55 Million Final Judgment Against Investment Ad-
viser CEO, Exchange Act Release No. 23228 (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2015/lr23228.htm [https://perma.cc/YX2Q-9UZC]. See generally Verity Winship,
Punishment Without a Crime, ILL. PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 18, 2017), https://will.illinois.edu/le
galissuesinthenews/program/punishment-without-a-crime [https://perma.cc/H49W-EMY6].
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an
action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecu-
niary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the
date when the claim first accrued.”).
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cide whether the statutory time limit also applied to disgorgement.16
In Kokesh, the U.S. Supreme Court responded by putting two aspects
of the disgorgement remedy on the table. First, it classified disgorgement
as a “penalty” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 and its five-year stat-
ute of limitations.17 It supported its argument in part by quoting the
Texas Gulf Sulphur trial court’s description of disgorgement’s function.18
Not only did disgorgement “remove any monetary reward for violating
securities laws,” but it also “provid[ed] an effective deterrent to future
violations.”19 According to the Kokesh Court, this deterrent function was
evidence that disgorgement was punitive and therefore a “penalty.”20 It
therefore concluded that the five-year statute of limitations applied to
disgorgement.
Second, and more broadly, the Kokesh opinion potentially destabilized
the SEC’s use of “ancillary” remedies such as disgorgement. The devil is
in the details, or in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court, in the footnotes.
In footnote three of Kokesh, the Court disclaimed any opinion on
“whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforce-
ment proceedings.”21 By making this disclaimer rather than treating the
issue as settled and obvious, the Court suggested that the SEC’s authority
to order disgorgement might be up for debate.22 This implication was not
lost on litigants and triggered challenges to the SEC’s power to order this
and other remedies “ancillary” to the injunctions that were specifically
provided for by statute.23
16. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1638 (2017).
17. Id. at 1639.
18. Id. at 1643.
19. Id. at 1640 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 312 F. Supp. 77, 92 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)).
20. Id. at 1642. Kokesh seems in tension with the fact that the appeals court in Texas
Gulf Sulphur had explicitly rejected appellants’ argument that the requested remedy was a
penalty assessment. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971)
(rejecting the contention that “the required restitution is indeed a penalty assessment,”
even where the remedy required disgorgement of the profits of the tippees). For an exam-
ple of the—then unsuccessful—argument that the remedy in TGS “would constitute a pen-
alty which the Court does not have jurisdiction to impose,” see Trial Memorandum for
Defendant Coates at 34, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, No. 65-cv-1182 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,
1966).
21. 137 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3.
22. For a detailed examination of the statutory support for disgorgement orders in
SEC enforcement actions, see Donna M. Nagy, The Statutory Authority for Court-Ordered
Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions, 71 SMU L. REV. (2018). A nuanced analysis of
the Kokesh footnote can be found in Daniel R. Walfish, Other People’s Money: SEC Dis-
gorgement After Kokesh, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.milbank.com/images/con-
tent/9/1/v3/91867/NYLJ-SEC-Disgorgement-After-Kokesh-Sept-2017.pdf (arguing that
Kokesh’s footnote three presages more attention to the scope of disgorgement).
23. See SEC v. Sample, No. 3:14-CV-1218-B, 2017 WL 5569873, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov.
20, 2017) (mem. op.); SEC v. Jammin Java Corp., No. 15-CV-08921, 2017 WL 4286180, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017). See generally Matthew C. Solomon et al., Kokesh v. SEC:
Half a Year On, CLEARY ENFORCEMENT WATCH, (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.clearyen
forcementwatch.com/2018/01/kokesh-v-sec-half-year/ [https://perma.cc/NQ7U-SSDL]. Cf.
CFTC v. Reisinger, No. 11-CV-08567, 2017 WL 4164197, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2017);
FTC v. J. Williams Enters., LLC, No. 6:16-CV-2123-Orl-31DCI, 2017 WL 4776669, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2017).
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II. REMEDIES IN SEC INSIDER TRADING ENFORCEMENT
For its first sixty years, the SEC relied only on injunctive relief. Since
its inception, the SEC has had explicit statutory authority to seek injunc-
tions “[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is
engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation”
of the Exchange Act or related rules.24
Although established much later, the agency’s power to seek monetary
penalties is also authorized by statute.25 The first steps to authorizing
penalties were taken in the area of insider trading. In the 1980s, Congress
enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), which authorized,
and then expanded, penalty authority for this type of violation.26 Several
years later, Congress expanded this remedy beyond insider trading cases.
The 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
gave the SEC authorization to seek money penalties more broadly.27
Over time, this power has been extended to cases brought in administra-
tive proceedings as well.28
Other remedies are based on the court’s equity jurisdiction. Although
disgorgement is not mentioned by name, a statute allows the SEC to seek
equitable relief in court: “In any action or proceeding brought or insti-
tuted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the
Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable
relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”29
The SEC also has explicit statutory authorization to seek “accounting and
disgorgement” in administrative proceedings.30
Disgorgement amounts are not always easily calculated, but the key
notion is that disgorgement is measured by the wrongful gains of the vio-
lators. It is not measured by the harm to any victims and thus differs from
“restitution” which, at least in its modern law-enforcement usage, refers
to a remedy aimed at compensating victims of an offense.31 Disgorge-
24. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(1) (2012).
25. Although the Kokesh Court complicates the terminology in this area by classifying
disgorgement as a penalty for the purposes of the statute of limitations, for convenience
this article uses the term “monetary penalty” or “civil money penalty” in its traditional
sense, in which it is akin to a fine and does not include disgorgement. See, e.g., NICOLE A.
BAKER ET AL., THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES
194–207 (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, 2d ed. 2007).
26. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A; Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984). SEC authority to seek money penalties in
insider trading cases was later expanded to allow for penalties against controlling persons.
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(1988).
27. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(d) (2012).
28. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(e), 78u-3(e), 80b-3(k)(5).
31. See generally Winship, supra note 13, at 1112–13. Courts historically mixed the
terms “disgorgement” and “restitution.” Texas Gulf Sulphur is an example. The terminol-
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ment may be returned to investors, but this compensatory function is inci-
dental to the remedy; it is not required, nor is it the measure of the
amount.32
For insider trading, unlawful profits and penalty amounts are explicitly
linked by statute. ITSA allows civil money penalties of up to three times
the profit gained or loss avoided.33 That limit is a maximum, and the SEC
long had a standard practice, at least in settled cases, of requiring insider
trading defendants to disgorge the profits made (or losses avoided) plus a
penalty equal to the disgorgement amount—the so-called one plus one
formula.34
III. STUDY OF DISGORGEMENT IN INSIDER TRADING:
FY2005-FY2015
To what extent has the SEC sought disgorgement? In its legal briefs in
Kokesh, the SEC indicated that it “seeks disgorgement in the majority of
its enforcement actions.”35 The agency has ordered several billions of dol-
lars in disgorgement annually in recent years. In its FY2017 annual re-
port, the agency reported that it ordered targets to pay $2.9 billion in
disgorgement, up from approximately $2.8 billion the previous year.36 In
both years, the amount of disgorgement was two-to-three times the total
civil money penalties ordered.37 So disgorgement became an important
tool for the SEC. This study adds granularity to these aggregate numbers,
focusing on the disgorgement of profits from insider trading.
A. METHODOLOGY
The study tracks remedies ordered against defendants and respondents
(collectively “defendants”) who resolved SEC civil insider trading actions
ogy is mixed, but the court distinguishes between the functions of giving up unlawful prof-
its and compensating those harmed. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08
(2d Cir. 1971).
32. Disgorgement funds could traditionally be distributed to investors. See SEC, Re-
port Pursuant to Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. The statutory “Fair
Funds” provision allows, but does not require, the SEC to distribute money collected from
penalties to injured investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246; Winship, supra note 13, at 1103.
33. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1.
34. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Speech at the 24th Annual Ray Gar-
rett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004) (describing the “one plus
one” remedy, noting that this approach “was thought to enhance deterrence and stream-
line settlement negotiations” but also pointing to contemporary deviations from this
formula); see generally NICOLE A. BAKER ET AL., THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MAN-
UAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 201 (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, 2d ed. 2007).
35. Brief for Respondent at 10–11, Kokesh v. SEC, No. 16-529, 2016 WL 7210497
(U.S. Dec. 9, 2016) (citing Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal 2015, www.sec.gov/report-
spubs/select-sec-and-market-data/secstats2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9YR-G9EE] (last
visited Dec. 9, 2016); H.R. Rep. No. 616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990)).
36. SEC DIV. OF ENF’T, ANN. REP. FY2017, at 7, https://www.sec.gov/files/enforce-
ment-annual-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD7Q-A9DX] (explaining that disgorge-
ment comprised 78% of the total money ordered in FY2017 and 69% of the total in
FY2016). The SEC Annual Report does not indicate whether prejudgment interest is
included.
37. Id.
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during SEC fiscal years 2005 to 2015 (October 1, 2004, to September 30,
2015).38
The initial search was conducted in the SEC defendant database in
Lexis Securities Mosaic, narrowing the type of violation to insider trading
and excluding criminal actions or pleas.39 The resulting list included in-
sider trading actions brought both in court and in administrative proceed-
ings. The information included the remedies the SEC ordered in each
action. Where the database was ambiguous or incomplete, the underlying
litigation release or the underlying settlement agreement was obtained
and reviewed.40
One caveat about the data is that the SEC sometimes orders remedies
jointly. Sometimes defendants were jointly and severally responsible for
all of the remedies,41 but other times only disgorgement was joint, with
38. The actions were assigned a fiscal year based on when the SEC publicly announced
them in a litigation release or administrative proceeding. Support for using this announce-
ment date as a proxy for the resolution date can be found in other studies of SEC settle-
ments. See, e.g., Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, An Empirical Study of
Admissions in SEC Settlements, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 n.34 (2018) (finding that SEC public
announcements and agreement dates in the study’s dataset were almost all within the same
fiscal year, with almost half announced on the same day as the agreement was executed).
39. The study used Lexis Securities Mosaic’s classification of violations and actions.
Most entries identified through this search listed insider trading as the only violation type.
Of the defendants who were ordered to pay some sort of monetary remedy, jointly or
individually, 8% (58/748) listed other Lexis Securities Mosaic categories of violation in
addition to insider trading, often sale of securities. Actions in which the only relief was an
asset freeze were excluded because these were preliminary actions to bring suit and pre-
serve assets, so they did not report a resolution. Actions were also excluded where the only
relief was a suspension, a bar, or a bar lifted. These were excluded as follow-on actions:
actions that do not identify any new conduct, but only impose additional sanctions (ordina-
rily a bar or suspension) for a prior injunction or guilty plea. See, e.g., Select SEC and
Market Data Fiscal 2016, at 3 (last visited Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/2017-03/
secstats2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8797-ZS7B] (separately listing standalone and follow-on
actions).
40. Extensive review was also required to eliminate duplicates. When defendants or
disgorgement amounts were listed more than once, the underlying litigation release and/or
settlement agreement was reviewed. If the entries were duplicates (same defendant, settle-
ment and remedy in same matter), the duplicate(s) were eliminated, leaving only one en-
try. If, for instance, one disgorgement order was reported multiple times (e.g., once when
the settlement was entered and once when the court approved it), the earlier instance was
eliminated. If defendants were subject to multiple disgorgement orders in relation to sepa-
rate conduct, these were retained, and each was counted separately in the total of defend-
ants and calculations of disgorgement and other remedies. See, e.g., Former Schottenfeld
Proprietary Trader Gautham Shankar Settles SEC Insider Trading Charges, Exchange Act
Release No. 22011 (June 21, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22011
.htm [https://perma.cc/8V9P-6CTF]; Former Schottenfeld Proprietary Trader Gautham
Shankar Settles SEC Insider Trading Charges, Exchange Act Release No. 22010 (June 21,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22010.htm [https://perma.cc/BG7K-
PTFV] (detailing actions against same target for trading in different stock on different non-
public information).
41. See, e.g., Final Judgment As to Defendants Langly Partners, L.P., North Olmsted
Partners, L.P., & Quantico Partners, L.P., SEC v. Langley Partners LP et al., Docket No.
06-cv-00467 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2006) (making defendants “jointly and severally liable” for
disgorgement and prejudgment interest, and ordering them to “jointly and severally pay” a
civil penalty). For limits on joint and several liability for civil monetary penalties, see SEC
v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 725 F.3d 279, 287–88 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing a penalty
because it had been imposed jointly and severally).
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civil money penalties imposed individually. So, for instance, in one insider
trading case, two brothers were ordered to pay jointly a disgorgement
amount of approximately $180,000, with separate penalties of $150,000
each.42 The results reported below specify when these joint remedies are
included or excluded.
It is also worth noting that the study captures the remedies ordered in
the SEC action. It does not take into account whether these were ever
paid,43 reductions because of financial condition,44 or offsets against rem-
edies ordered in other actions for the same conduct.45
B. RESULTS
1. Monetary Remedies
The study identified 798 defendants who resolved SEC insider trading
actions from FY2005 to FY2015.46 Of these defendants, 748 (94%) were
ordered to pay some sort of monetary remedy—disgorgement and/or
money penalties—either individually or jointly.47 The total disgorgement
ordered for the full time period was $987,356,081.48 For the same period,
42. Previously Unknown Insider Traders in Heinz Agree to $5 Million Settlement, Ex-
change Act Release No. 22841 (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2013/lr22841.htm [https://perma.cc/T75J-G9XB].
43. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforce-
ment Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 948–49 (2016) (noting the gap between amounts
ordered and amounts collected, and giving the example that the SEC collected half of the
monetary penalties ordered in FY 2014).
44. See, e.g., Court Enters Final Judgments Against Ernesto V. Sibal, Doseph J. Shin,
Chae Hyon Chin, Benjamin Y. Chiu and Pejman Sabet, Exchange Act Release No. 19328
(Aug. 8, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19328.htm [https://perma.cc/
D6A5-BYF3] (noting that Chin consented to the entry of a judgment of more than
$125,000, but that the court waived payment of all but about $74,000 because of financial
condition).
45. See, e.g., Former Trader Emanuel Goffer Settles SEC Insider Trading Charges,
Exchange Act Release No. 22721 (June 11, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2013/lr22721.htm [https://perma.cc/EC3R-WRAK] (offsetting disgorgement ordered in the
SEC action against forfeiture in a criminal action based on the same conduct); Final Judg-
ment As To Defendant Sung Kook Hwang, SEC v. Tiger Asia Mgmt., LLC, 2012 WL
9508328 12-cv-7601 (DMC) (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2012) (noting that disgorgement and prejudg-
ment interest will be “credited dollar for dollar by the amount ordered to be paid in resti-
tution” in a related criminal action); SEC Charges Former Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Enron Energy Services with Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 20658
(July 29, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20658.htm [https://perma.cc/
R4JE-QR6A] (noting that the defendant was entitled to a $6 million offset based on the
resolution of a related civil case in another court).
46. As noted above, the study relied on Lexis Securities Mosaic classifications of viola-
tion, using its identification in the first instance of insider trading actions. It also excluded
duplicates, preliminary relief, and follow-ons. See LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, https://
www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-securities-mosaic.page [https://perma.cc/4WUZ-
5X4B]. See supra notes 39–40.
47. One defendant was ordered to pay prejudgment interest only, without disgorge-
ment or a money penalty. See SEC Litig. Rel. 21185A (Aug. 27, 2009), SEC v. Marshall,
Docket No. 08-CV-2527 (S.D.N.Y.), Final Judgment As To Alan L. Tucker (Aug. 31, 2009).
This order is not included in the total.
48. To avoid overcounting, joint orders of disgorgement were counted only once. Joint
orders were identified by reviewing the underlying documents for any nonzero duplicate
disgorgement amounts that appeared in the initial Lexis Securities Mosaic list. See supra
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the total amount of penalties ordered was $549,735,769.49 Figure 1 reports
the annual totals, tracking how the SEC’s use of the disgorgement rem-
edy and money penalties has varied over time.
In most years, the total amount of disgorgement ordered exceeded the
total civil money penalties ordered. The figure reflects a spike in the dis-
gorgement amounts for FY2005 and a spike in both disgorgement and
penalties in FY2013. The total for FY2005 includes the second highest
disgorgement amount identified in the study ($200M). No penalty was
ordered in that action.50 The total for FY2013 includes the highest dis-
gorgement amount identified in the study ($275M), which was accompa-
nied by an equally large penalty (also $275M).51
Figure 1: Annual Monetary Remedies52
(SEC Insider Trading Actions FY2005-FY2015)
note 40 & accompanying text. This exclusion was important: a sum of the disgorgement
amounts listed per defendant without excluding joint amounts would overcount the total
by more than $125 million.
49. To avoid overcounting, joint orders of money penalties were counted only once.
Some of the joint disgorgement orders included separate individual penalty amounts. Each
of these individual penalty amounts is included in this total.
50. SEC Litig. Rel. No. 19259 (June 9, 2005), SEC v. Poyiadjis, Docket No. 01-CV-
8903 (S.D.N.Y.), Former Aremissoft Chief Executive Officer Consents to Permanent In-
junctive Relief and Officer-and-Director Bar; Poyjadijis Pays Approximately $200 Million.
51. The action was against CR Intrinsic Investors, a hedge fund advisory firm affiliated
with SAC Capital. See SEC Litig. Rel. No. 22647 (Mar. 18, 2013), SEC v. CR Intrinsic
Investors LLC, Civ. Act. No. 8466 (reporting that the settlement was “the largest ever in
an insider trading case”). The third highest amount of disgorgement ordered during the
time period of the study was $45 million. SEC Litig. Rel. 21825 (Jan. 25, 2011), SEC v.
Nacchio, Docket No. 05-cv-480-MSK-CBS (D. Co.), Court Enters Final Judgment Against
Former CEO of Qwest Communications Int’l Joseph P. Nacchio.
52. The SEC’s fiscal year is from October 1 to September 30. Where disgorgement was
ordered jointly, only one disgorgement amount is included. Where civil money penalties
were ordered jointly, only one penalty amount is included.
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2. Patterns of Disgorgement
The study identified 695 defendants ordered to pay disgorgement, ei-
ther individually or jointly. Disgorgement was ordered against 93% (695/
748) of defendants who were ordered to pay any type of monetary
remedy.
If joint disgorgement orders are counted only once, the total number of
unique disgorgement orders is 630. The figure below shows the size of
disgorgement orders in SEC insider trading actions from FY2005 to
FY2015. Notably, the median disgorgement amount was $62,756, which is
indicative of the concentration of awards at the low end of the range.53
Although the overall average disgorgement ordered was $1,567,232,54
more than half of the awards were under $100,000 and only 12% were $1
million or above. Moreover, the range was enormous: from $1 to approxi-
mately $275 million.55
Figure 2: Disgorgement Amounts56
(SEC Insider Trading Actions FY2005-FY2015)
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53. In calculating the median, joint disgorgement orders were counted only once.
54. In calculating the average, joint disgorgement orders were counted only once. If
jointly liable defendants are included, the average disgorgement was $1,420,656: the $987
million total disgorgement divided by the 695 defendants ordered to pay disgorgement,
either individually or jointly.
55. During the time period between Fair Funds and Dodd-Frank, the SEC had to or-
der disgorgement to trigger the creation of a fund to distribute to injured investors. The
two $1 disgorgement orders may be triggered by that. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-05-670, SEC AND CFTC PENALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COL-
LECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED 28 (2005)
(indicating that internal SEC guidance at the time recommended seeking nominal dis-
gorgement to trigger the Fair Funds provision). Even if those nominal amounts (anything
below $100, for instance) are eliminated, the next highest value is $327.
56. The chart does not include insider trading defendants against whom no
disgorgement was ordered. Joint disgorgement orders were counted only once.
2018] Disgorgement in Insider Trading Cases 1009
3. Relationship Between Disgorgement and Money Penalties
As noted above, monetary remedies (disgorgement and/or civil money
penalties) were ordered either individually or jointly against 748 defend-
ants. Of these, both a penalty and disgorgement were ordered against
70% (527/748). Disgorgement was the only type of monetary relief or-
dered against 22% (168/748). And penalties were the only monetary re-
lief ordered against 7% (53/748).57
Although the study did not attempt to formally assess the SEC’s ratio-
nale for the choice of remedy, some of the underlying documents provide
examples. In particular, several indicated that the court ordered disgorge-
ment without penalties because of payment of fines or restitution (or jail
time) in parallel criminal actions based on the same conduct;58 because of
the defendant’s cooperation with the SEC;59 or because of the defen-
dant’s inability to pay.60
The SEC ordered 527 defendants to pay both disgorgement and penal-
ties, including defendants who were jointly liable. The penalty and dis-
gorgement amounts were equal (1:1 ratio) for 56% (294/527).
Disgorgement was larger than the penalty ordered for 23% (121/527),
and the penalty was larger than disgorgement for 21% (112/527).
The statute permits penalties of up to three times the amount of profit
(or loss avoided), but most defendants did not seem to max out the pen-
alty amount.61 Of all the defendants who were ordered to pay both
money penalties and disgorgement, 90% (475/527) paid penalties of less
than three times the disgorgement amount.62
The average ratio of penalty to disgorgement was 2.2 to 1, with a me-
57. These add to less than 100% because of rounding.
58. See, e.g., Final Judgment As to Defendant Joseph A. Dawson at 6, SEC v. Joseph
A. Dawson, No. 11-cv-1615 (D. ND Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (“[N]o civil penalty shall be imposed
upon Defendant in this civil action based upon the criminal sanctions imposed in United
States v. Joseph A. Dawson,” a parallel criminal action.).
59. See, e.g., Final Judgment As to Defendant Adam Smith at 3, SEC v. Smith, No. 11-
cv-00535 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2011) (“[B]ased on Defendant’s agreement to cooperate in a
Commission investigation and/or related enforcement action, the Court is not ordering
Defendant to pay a civil penalty.”).
60. See, e.g., Court Enters Final Judgment Against James J. McDermott and Kathryn
B. Gannon, Exchange Act Release No. 19250 (June 7, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr19250.htm [https://perma.cc/YH9G-RZM6] (holding Gannon liable for dis-
gorgement and prejudgment interest, but noting that they “waived payment of disgorge-
ment and prejudgment interest and did not order her to pay a civil penalty” because of
financial condition); Final Judgment As to Defendant Robert Y. Joo at 5, SEC v. Sibal et.
al, No. 05-cv-3133 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2006). As noted above, the study captures the amount
of disgorgement ordered, regardless of waiver or offset. See supra notes 43–45 & accompa-
nying text.
61. One caveat is that this treats disgorgement as a good measure of profit (or loss
avoided) without taking into account one peculiarity of disgorgement in the insider trading
context: that a tipper may be required to disgorge tippees’ profits. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.
Ct. 1635, 1639 (2017); SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 303–04 (2d Cir. 2014).
62. Eleven defendants were ordered to pay exactly three times the disgorgement
amount.
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dian ratio of 1:1 and a standard deviation of 8.5.63 The chart below exam-
ines the relationship between the amount of disgorgement ordered
against a defendant and the size of the money penalty ordered against
that defendant in the same action. It depicts actions in which penalties
and disgorgement were each $1 million or under.64 Each point (x,y) rep-
resents the monetary remedies ordered in an insider trading action. The
disgorgement amount is x and the penalty amount ordered in the same
action against the same defendant is y. The figure is limited to defendants
who were ordered to pay both civil money penalties and disgorgement,
including those who were jointly liable.65 The diagonal line shows orders
where the ratio of the penalty to disgorgement was 1:1. The concentration
of points in the lower left reflects the large proportion of low value
awards.




























Disgorgement Ordered (in Thousands)
63. Joint orders are included. Excluded from this calculation are three instances in
which large penalties were ordered while disgorgement was ordered in a nominal amount
($1, $1, $2), with ratios of penalty to disgorgement above 200,000 to 1. Excluding these
amounts, the range was from a minimum ratio of .03 to 1 to a maximum of 147.1 to 1.
64. Approximately 87% (459/527) of all of the defendants ordered to pay both dis-
gorgement and penalties (including jointly liable defendants) are in this category (dis-
gorgement and penalty amounts of $1 million or less). Figure 3 is limited to amounts of $1
million or less so that the patterns are visible, but similar patterns are observed if all de-
fendants are included.
65. Jointly liable defendants appear as a single point if disgorgement and money pen-
alty were both ordered jointly. However, some defendants were ordered to pay disgorge-
ment jointly but separate penalty amounts or vice versa. See, e.g., supra note 41 &
accompanying text. In these instances, defendants appear as separate points that reflect the
respective disgorgement and penalty amounts.
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4. Prejudgment Interest
SEC rules provide for payment of prejudgment interest “on any sum
required to be paid pursuant to an order of disgorgement,” although
there may be exceptions.66 The rule also details how the interest should
be calculated, including the interest rate and quarterly compounding.67
In many instances, granular information about the disgorgement
amount and the amount of prejudgment interest was available either
from Lexis Securities Mosaic or from the underlying litigation release or
settlement document.68 The study identified specific non-zero amounts of
prejudgment interest for 559 orders of disgorgement.69
The specific information about the prejudgment interest and the re-
lated disgorgement amount permits a rough calculation of the time pe-
riod for which interest was charged. Calculations of compound interest
often focus on figuring out a final dollar amount based on what is known
about the initial dollar amount, the rate of interest, the compounding
method, and the time period over which the interest is paid. Here, the
specific disgorgement and prejudgment interest amounts provide the ini-
tial and final amounts,70 and SEC rules prescribe the interest rates and
method of compounding. The only information missing is the time period
for which interest was charged, but because all the other variables are
known or can be estimated, that can be calculated using the equation for
compound interest.71
The rough calculation using the data in this study suggests that when
interest is charged, it is not generally being charged for periods going
back beyond five years. By this measure, only 2% of the total interest
reported appeared to reach back to periods over five years.72 These re-
sults have the potential to provide an approximate indication of the time
between the conduct and the date of the disgorgement order: the SEC
66. SEC Rule of Practice 600, 17 C.F.R. § 201.600; 29A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. Prejudgment
Interest § 70:420, Westlaw (2018).
67. The rule cross-references interest rates in the Internal Revenue Code. It uses the
underpayment rate of interest: federal short term rate plus three percentage points. I.R.C.
§ 6621(a)(2) (1998). The IRS publishes its underpayment rates, including a chart of historic
rates. See I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2018–07.
68. Information about the interest was not always included in the Lexis Securities Mo-
saic defendant database or the litigation release. See LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, https://
www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-securities-mosaic.page [https://perma.cc/4WUZ-
5X4B]. Where the database said “no amount was given” or reported combined monetary
remedies only, the underlying settlement agreement was reviewed.
69. Joint disgorgement orders were counted only once. For 67 instances when dis-
gorgement was ordered (excluding joint orders), the amount of prejudgment interest was 0.
70. The disgorgement amount is the initial amount, and disgorgement plus prejudg-
ment interest is the final amount.
71. This calculation uses this formula: Sf = Si(1+ )N where Sf is the amount of dis-
gorgement plus interest announced at the time of the disgorgement order; Si is the amount
of disgorgement ordered,  is the average interest rate and N is the unit of time. To find the
number of units of time that have passed, the formula Nlog(1+ ) = log(Sf/Si) is used.
72. Using a 3% average interest rate (the lowest IRS corporate underpayment rate for
the whole period of the study, which accordingly results in the longest time frames), inter-
est was charged for less than one year for 48% of defendants (270/559), for one to five
years for 50% (279/559), and for over five years for only 2% of defendants (10/559).
1012 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
rule measures interest from the first day of the month following the viola-
tion to the last day of the month before disgorgement is paid.73
There are many caveats about this calculation: The interest rate used
here is estimated and averaged. The SEC rule calls for interest to be cal-
culated for the period between conduct and judgment, but this may not
be coextensive with the time period at issue for other purposes—includ-
ing the time period relevant to calculating the statute of limitations. The
SEC may adjust interest amounts for other reasons.74 Nonetheless, these
prejudgment interest amounts may be a fruitful area for inquiry, either
for what they indicate about the enforcement timeframe or what they
suggest about agency practices.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The data confirm that disgorgement was ordered in the vast majority of
SEC insider trading actions. As noted above, disgorgement was ordered
against 93% of the defendants who had to pay monetary remedies75 and
87% of all of the insider trading defendants who resolved actions during
the study’s time period.76
The data also confirm that the practice of ordering equal amounts of
disgorgement and money penalties (“one plus one”) was common. Where
both disgorgement and penalties were ordered, more than half of the de-
fendants (56%) were ordered to pay “one plus one.” This percentage sug-
gests, however, that the practice was not uniform across the board.77
The relationship between penalties and disgorgement may also shed
light on one of the questions that Kokesh raises: If Kokesh were to
destabilize the use of disgorgement altogether, could the agency reach the
same result with penalties alone? In other words, could the agency reach
the same amounts by using money penalties as a substitute?
In the insider trading context, the limit on penalties in district court is
tagged to the amounts of profit (or loss avoided).78 In particular, penal-
ties may be up to three times the profit (or loss avoided).79 Very few of
the penalty amounts in this study were that high. If disgorgement is a
good measure of the amount of profit or loss avoided,80 that suggests that
73. SEC Rule of Practice 600, 17 C.F.R. § 201.600.
74. See, e.g., Final Judgment As to Joseph J. Donohue, SEC v. Decinces, 11-cv-1168
(C.C. Ca. Aug. 9, 2011) (“[B]ased on defendant’s agreement to cooperate in a Commission
investigation and/or related enforcement action, the Court is not ordering Defendant to
pay prejudgment interest”).
75. The SEC ordered 748 defendants to pay monetary remedies; 695 of these were
ordered to pay disgorgement, either jointly or individually.
76. The study identified 798 defendants who resolved SEC insider trading actions from
SEC FY2005 to FY2015; 695 of these were ordered to pay disgorgement, either jointly or
individually.
77. An examination of the relationship between the type of remedy ordered and the
specific characteristics of the case or defendant—including the defendant’s place in the
tipping chain—is beyond the scope of this study. It is a worthwhile area for further study.
78. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2012).
79. Id.
80. See supra note 61.
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there may be room for increasing penalty amounts. This assumes, how-
ever, that Kokesh’s application of the five-year limit to disgorgement
does not affect the underlying benchmark for figuring out penalty
amounts.81
Perhaps the agency could use money penalties as a substitute for dis-
gorgement, maintaining the same payment amounts by shifting the cate-
gory of monetary remedy. However, different remedies may trigger
different collateral consequences for the defendant and for the agency
(e.g., tax treatment,82 availability of funds for distribution to injured in-
vestors,83 triggering prejudgment interest, etc.).
The second question raised by Kokesh is how much SEC practices
would be affected by Kokesh’s directive to apply the five-year statute of
limitations to disgorgement. This study does not answer that directly, al-
though it begins to map out a way to use the prejudgment interest
amounts as an indicator of the timeframe. Preliminary calculations based
on this measure suggest that the SEC charged very few defendants inter-
est for more than five years.
In general, the study reported here provides a baseline for assessing
what past agency practices may have to change in light of the newly im-
posed statute of limitations in Kokesh. And to map the path since dis-
gorgement was first introduced in Texas Gulf Sulphur.
81. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1638 (2017).
82. Disgorgement used to be deductible in taxes, but post-Kokesh, the IRS has sig-
naled that it will revisit this question now that the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized
both civil penalties and disgorgement as “penalties,” at least in the context of the statute of
limitations.
83. Before a change in the law in Dodd-Frank, some disgorgement was required if the
agency wanted to direct funds to injured investors so that they could create a disgorgement
fund and aggregate the monetary penalties. See supra note 55.
